The relevant conditional probabilities are often calculated by means of Bayes' theorem, in which case the rule of updating by conditionalization is known as Bayes' rule. Ramsey's use of the word "consistently" in the foregoing passage might suggest that he has in mind a coherence argument to justify this rule parallel to the argument he used to justify the laws of the probability calculus as rules for consistent degrees of belief at a fixed time. But no such argument is given, either in this essay or elsewhere in his published writings. We are left to speculate as to whether he considered the argument too obvious to put down or whether he had no such argument.
There is a coherence argument, given explicitly by de Finetti, for the ratio definition of conditional probability: requires that conditional probabilities as fair betting ratios for conditional bets mesh with fair betting ratios for unconditional bets, as in the standard definition of conditional probability. None of this in itself, however, gives us a coherence argument for the rule of conditionalization for changing degrees of belief.
In an essay examining Savage's system, Ian Hacking points to the rule of conditionalization as an implicit assumption. He calls it the dynamic assumption of personalism:
The idea of the model of learning is that Prob(h/e) represents one's personal probability after one learns e. But formally the conditional probability represents no such thing. If, as in all of Savage's work, conditional probability is a defined notion, then Prob(h/e) stands merely for the quotient of two probabilities. It in no way represents what I have learned after I have taken e as a new datum point. It is only when we make the dynamic assumption that we can conclude anything about learning from experience. (Hacking 1967, p. 315) Hacking argues that no dynamic Dutch book argument is possible: a man knowing e would be incoherent if the rates offered on h unconditionally differed from his rates on h conditional on e. But no incoherence obtains when we shift from the point before e is known to the point after it is known. . . since the man announces his poste rates only after e is discovered, and simultaneously cancels his pree rates, there is no system for betting with him which is guaranteed success in the sence of a Dutch book. (1967, p. 315) Given the way Hacking structures the problem, with the bettor simply betting at two different times with someone whose degrees of belief at each of those times are statically coherent, it is clear why he thinks that no Dutch book is possible. But the problem can be given more structure.
Indeed, any plausible treatment of the case must give it more structure, for there must be some way of indicating in the statement of the problem that the man in question learns only e, rather than e together with some extra information. Furthermore, it is of some importance that we are discussing coherence not of separate degree-of-belief states but of a rule or strategy for changing such states upon receiving a proposition as input.
Let us consider a perfect model situation for the application of such rules. Suppose that our bookie has at time 1 a prior probability assignment, Pr,, over a probability space, and there is a countable partition of that space, {ei}, such that each member of that partition has positive prior probability. At time 2, the true member of the partition is announced and the bookie moves to a posterior probability, pr2, according to a strategy that treats the announced member of the partition as total input. Such a strategy is afunction, STRAT, which maps members of {ei} onto posterior probability distributions. The strategy of conditionalization maps ei onto the posterior probability, Pr2, such that Pr2(q) = Pr,(q/ei) for all q. There are many other possible strategies. We will allow a cunning bettor to bet with our bookie at each time. He must make bets that the bookie considers fair or favorable (non-negative expected utility) at the time. He is allowed to know the bookie's probabilities at the times of the bets and he is allowed to know the bookie's strategy. Formally, the bettor's strategy consists of a pair of functions. The first maps the pair consisting on the bookie's (Pr,, STRAT) onto bets to be made at t1 that for the bookie have non-negative expected utility at t1 according to his prl; the second maps (Pr,, STRAT, ei) onto bets to be made at t2 that for the bookie have nonnegative expected utility at t2 according to his pr2 = STRAT (ei). Let us say that the bettor makes a dynamic Dutch book against the bookie, if no matter what the true member, ei, of the partition, the bettor's strategy leaves him at t2 with a finite number of bets whose net payoff is positive for every point in ei. And we will say that the bookie's strategy is dynamically coherent if no bettor's strategy makes a dynamic Dutch book against it. Now there is an argument, due to David Lewis,' which shows that in the type of situation under consideration a dynamically coherent strategy must proceed by conditionalization: THEOREM I (LEWIS). If the bookie's strategy does not proceed by conditionalization on the evidence, he leaves himself open to a dynamic Dutch book.
Proof. Suppose that for some proposition (measurable set), q, in the bookie's probability space, and some member of his evidential partition, e, Prl(q/e) unequal to Pre(q) where Pre is the Pr2 onto which STRAT maps e. Then either (1) Prl(q/e) < Pre(q) or (2) Prl(q/e) > Pr2(e). If the first, let d = Pre(q) -Prl(q/e). The bettor can now proceed as follows: At t1 he proposes (i) the conditional bet to the 'Reported in Teller (1973 Teller ( , 1976 . Anyone who doubts the value of this argument because of qualms about the existence of a suitable prior should consider the arguments in Freedman and Purves (1969) . effect that if e&q the bookie pays him $ Pr, (not-q/e); if e&not-q he pays the bookie $ Prl(q/e); if not-e the bet is called off; and (ii) the sidebet on not-e such that if e, he pays the bookie $ d Pr, (note); if not-e, the bookie pays him $ d Pr,(e). The bookie judges these bets as fair at tl. At t2 if a member of the evidential partition other than e was revealed, the conditional bet is canceled and the cunning bettor wins the sidebet and gains $ d Prl(e). If e was the member of the evidential partition revealed at t2, then the bettor proposes an additional bet (iii) on q such that if q, he pays the bookie $ Pre(notq); if not-q, the bookie pay him $ Pre(q). The bookie regards these as fair, according to Pre. The net result of (i) and (iii) is then that the bettor wins $ d no matter whether q or not-q. He has lost $ d Prl(not-e) on the sidebet (ii), giving him again a net gain of $ Prl(e) on (i), (ii), and (iii). Case (2) is similar.
In the dynamic case, as in the static one, the possibility of a Dutch book is the result of an underlying pragmatic inconsistency. If the bookie has a rule for changing degrees of belief of the kind under discussion, and is in a situation such as we have described where the rule is applicable, then the bettor can achieve the effect of a bet on q conditional on a member, e, of the evidential partition in one of two ways. He can make the conditional bet at t, either directly or by making a finite number of unconditional bets that achieve the same effect. Or he can simply resolve to wait until t2 and make the bet on q at the revised rates if and only if e is the member of the partition announced. The second possibility is foreseeable by the bookie; it is based on his own rule for revising his degrees of belief. For the bookie to evaluate conditional bets consistently, his strategy must update his degrees of belief by conditionalization on the evidence.
2. Probability Kinematics. Can we build an adequate theory of evidence in which conditionalization is the only rule for updating degrees of belief? There is a tradition in epistemology that goes back to the Stoics that is favorable to an affirmative answer. According to this general view, there is a kind of evidence that is the foundation for all knowledge. When in possession of such evidence one is unmistakably led to certainty in the appropriate evidential proposition; that proposition bears "the mark of truth" that compels unqualified assent. All other propositions are evaluated in relation to these foundational ones. Various versions of this view have surfaced since Hellenistic times, with the mark of truth being conferred by the senses or intuition or some combination; the most recent version being promulgated by one wing of the logical positivist movement. On such a view, one simply updates by conditionalization as new evidence comes in. If one's ultimate prior were also somehow given by intuition or reason, all of epistemology would be grounded in certainty. Such was, in its essentials, the program of Carnap's inductive logic, at least in the beginning.
But even leaving aside the question of the grand prior, it is hard to swallow the view that evidence comes as neatly packaged as the Stoics claim it does. Their doctrine was forcefully opposed in their own time by the academic skeptics who held that all knowledge is "probable" rather than certain, and in our own time by epistemologists as diverse as J. L. Austin, Sir Karl Popper, and Wilfrid Sellars. According to the strict skeptical view, conditionalization is never justified. One need not be a complete skeptic, however, to doubt that conditionalization is always the appropriate model. Even a positivist who believed in the possibility of an adequate language of sense data might not have that language in hand yet. Everyone has an interest in how belief revision in the light of evidence that does not render any proposition in the agent's language certain should be handled.
Addressing this problem, Richard Jeffrey (1965) suggested a generalization of the rule of conditionalization as a way to deal with some cases of uncertain evidence. Suppose {ej} is a partition all of whose members have positive initial probability, Pri. A subsequent probability, Prf, is said to come from Pri by probability kinematics on {ej} iff: Pri(q/ej) = Prf(q/ej) for allj and all q.
Jeffrey uses the name "probability kinematics" to suggest the absence of informational forces that might deform the probabilities conditional on members of the partition. In statisticians' language the partition {ej} is a sufficient partition for the class of probability distributions that can come from Pri by probability kinematics on {ej}, and a measurable function whose set of inverse images is the partition is a sufficient statistic for that class of probability distributions. (For a nice discussion, see Diaconis and Zabell 1982.) Belief revision by probability kinematics is a natural generalization of conditionalization. The partition must, of course, be one appropriate to the evidence; the evidential event should give us information salient only to the relative probabilities of members of the partition. If the information gives one member of the partition final probability of one, we have belief change by conditionalization on that member of the partition. The set of probabilities that can come from a prior that gives every member of {ej} positive probability, by probability kinematics on {ej}, is a convex set of which the probability measures that come by conditionalization on a member of {ej} are the extreme points.
There is an obvious question to ask: "Is there a dynamic coherence argument for probability kinematics?" The answer is not quite obvious, because the whole point of probability kinematics is to deal with the sort of situation where there is no proposition in the agent's language that represents the epistemic input of the evidential experience. How then, do we represent his strategy for changing degrees of belief? Let us consider these questions in the context of an example of the sort of situation that Jeffrey had in mind.
3. The Observation Game. Player A (the bookie) is shown a jellybean under dim light, and on the basis of this observational event may revise his prior probabilities of its color. Subsequently, he is told its true color by the gamemaster. Player A has three salient probability distributions: Pr1 (before the observation); Pr2 (after the observation); Pr3 (after the gamemaster announces the true color); over a discrete probability space whose points represent (color, flavor) pairs. Sets of points in this space can be thought of as representing propositions about the bean in question. (I will use the ampersand, '&', for set intersection and the dash, '-' for set complement.) Player B (the cunning bettor) can make bets with player A at any of the corresponding times, t1, t2, t3, regarding the color and flavor of the bean. Player B doesn't get to make any observations, but at each time he is allowed to know player A's probability measure over this space at that time. He also gets to know player A's strategy for changing degrees of belief.
3.1. Strategies. Allow me to begin with some heuristic considerations that motivate the definition of strategies. Player A comes into the game with an initial probability, Pr1, which is modified in response to the observation to yield Pr2. If the information that the observational event supplied were just that the true situation were in some set in his probability space, then we could require that his strategy specify his Pr2 as a function of that given set (as in the strategy of conditionalization). But we are here interested in the case in which information conveyed by observation cannot be captured in this way. We suppose that the light is too dim, the probability space too crude, to allow for this possibility. Lacking such an observational proposition, we require at this point only that player A's strategy specify a class of possible Pr2's that he takes to be permissible.
At t3 player A learns just the color of the jellybean, and here he does have a set, COLOR, which captures what he learns. His strategy must specify his output, Pr3, as a function of his (Pr2, COLOR). We need, however, some way of building into the specification of his strategy that his observation at t2 is salient only to the partition of colors; of ruling out that he cheats by perhaps sniffing the bean when he is supposed to be only observing its color. If the change from Pr1 to Pr2 reflects only the acquisition of information about color, then when at t3 player A is told the true color of the jellybean, this should supersede whatever imperfect information about color he obtained by the act of observation in dim light. We build in the prohibition against extra illicit information by requiring that Pr3 be a function of COLOR alone.
We will assume for simplicity that player A's Pr1 and Pr2 must give each atom of the probability space positive probability and that his Pr3 gives each flavor positive probability. Player A must believe the gamemaster: Pr3 ( Inspection of the proof of the foregoing theorem shows that player B knows the magnitude, e, of the discrepancy between player A's strategy and probability kinematics before he makes his first bet; at t, in case 1 and at t2 in case 2. He could, then, modify the strategy given by inflating the stakes by a factor of $ N/e Pr1(C) to fit the e and C involved, where N is an arbitrarily large positive real. Such a modified strategy for player B yields him a payoff of $ N in each course of play in which he bets at all. In case 1, he is assured of such a payoff. In case 2, he is assured of such a payoff if the offending Pr2 assignment appears, and does not bet otherwise.
Bulletproof Strategies and Potential
Centering. Because we allow player A to pick his set of possible Pr2's in the specification of his strategy, there is another way in which his strategy can fail to be bulletproof. He might, for example, choose his possible Pr2's such that for each one, Pr2(C&F) is less than Prl(C&F), for some particular color-flavor pair. In that case, player A's probability for C&F would have to move in a foreseeable direction, a fact that player B could exploit by betting against C&F at t1 and buying back the bet at a profit at t2.
If player A's strategy is such that for some proposition, Q, in the colorflavor space, Prl(Q) greater than Pr2(Q) for all Pr2's allowed by the strategy, we will say that player A's strategy is OUT. If his strategy is such that for some Q in the color-flavor space, there is a positive e such that Pr1(C&F) -Pr2(C&F) not less than e for all Pr2's, we will say that his strategy is DISTANT. If his strategy is such that for some such Q, for some Pr2, Pr1(Q) is greater than Pr2(Q) and for no Pr2 is Pr1 less than Pr2(Q), we will say that his strategy is NOT-IN. 
Proof is obvious.
Being not-IN, OUT, and DISTANT are increasingly serious defects for player A's strategy, the least serious of which still prevents his strategy from being bulletproof. If the pr1 of player A's strategy can be represented as a mixture of the pr2's of his strategy, his strategy cannot be OUT or DISTANT. If his strategy has a finite number of pr2's, and the pr1 of his strategy can be represented as a mixture of his pr2's in which each pr2 has positive weight, then his strategy isn't not-IN, (because if it were not-IN, the hypothesized mixture would give Q probability less than pr1). The question of centering will be raised again in a context where it is possible to bet on the pr2's.
Higher-Order Probabilities and Absolute Dutch
Books. The foregoing discussion of the observation game focused on the concept of a bulletproof strategy. The state of being bulletproof is a strong coherence property, that is, a guarantee against a certain kind of conditional Dutch book. A conditional Dutch book is a set of bets such that they result in a net loss to the bookie (player A) if the condition is realized, and result in zero net transaction otherwise. A conditional Dutch book on a condition of positive probability can always be turned into an unconditional Dutch book by making the appropriate sidebet against the condition; but in the observation game, the conditions in question include the specification of an observational probability distribution, pr2. If player A has well-defined probabilities over courses of play in the game, the conditions of the conditional Dutch books that constitute scores against his strategy may well for him have probability zero. I did not assume in the foregoing discussion that the observer in the observation game had any such probabilities. The question arises as to what more can be said if he does. [The subsequent discussion owes much to the important work of Armendt (1980).] 4.1. Probability Kinematics. If for every sequence of play, player B's strategy results in bets at t3 whose net result is positive for him for all flavors, we will say that player B's strategy constitutes an unconditional dynamic Dutch book against that of player A. Under reasonable conditions, we can show that a strategy of belief change by probability kinematics on the observational partition almost everywhere (with respect to Pr,) is a necessary condition for avoiding an unconditional Dutch book.
Let us modify the observation game to get a version with higher-order probabilities as follows: Player A's three probability measures, Pr,, Pr2, and Pr3, are over an enlarged probability space. This space is the product of (a) the original discrete space of color-flavor pairs of "The Observation Game" and (b) the space of probability measures over space (a) with Lebesgue measurable sets in the appropriate n-space serving as the measurable sets. (These probability measures are to be interpreted as player A's Pr2 about which player A is uncertain at tl.) We assume that player A has a fixed initial probability, Pr,. Since Pr3 is a function of COLOR, we can take a set specified by a given Pr2 and color as tantamount to a specification of a quadruple, (Prj, Pr2, COLOR, Pr3), in player A's strategy. We will speak loosely of probabilities of sets of quadruples in this sense. We will say that player A's strategy proceeds by probability kinematics almost everywhere in Pr, if his Pr, gives his set of UNKINEMATIC quadruples probability zero. Lemmas 1 and 2 do not quite establish that this property is a necessary condition for avoiding an unconditional dynamic Dutch book because nothing has been said that requires these sets to be measurable. However, it is most reasonable to add the requirement that these sets be measurable if we regard player A's strategy not just as 5.1. Conditionalization. Consider the conditions for Lewis's dynamic Dutch book argument for conditionalization. The bookie has a prior at time 1 such that every member of a finite partition, pi, has positive prior probability. At time 2, he learns the true member of the partition and changes his probability assignment. His rule for change is a function that maps the pair (prior, member of the partition learned) to his posterior. A bettor gets to know the bookie's strategy, gets to know the true member of the partition, when the bookie does, and gets to make a finite number of bets at each time that the bookie considers fair at that time. The bettor's strategy is a pair of functions, one from the bookie's probability assignment at time 1 to a finite set of bets that the bookie considers fair at that time, and a second from the revealed member of the partition and the bookie's probability at time 2 to a finite set of bets that he considers fair at that time. The bookie's strategy together with that of the bettor determine a payoff function, which gives the net payoff of all bets for each state of the world. Lewis's argument shows that if the bookie's strategy is not to update by conditionalization, the bettor can choose a strategy such that the two yield a payoff function for the bettor that is positive everywhere. THEOREM V. If the bookie's strategy is to update by conditionalization, then there is no bettor's strategy that constitutes a Dutch book against him.
Let us call a quadruple, (Prj, Pr2, COLOR, Pr3), in Player A's strategy VULNERABLE if there is a color, C, and flavor, F, such that Pri (F/C) is defined for i = 1, 2, 3 and it is not the case that it takes on
Proof. Any payoff function that the bettor can achieve against the conditionalizing strategy by betting at t1 and t2 can be achieved by an alternative strategy that relies only on a finite number of bets all made at time 1. For every bet that the bettor's original strategy makes at tl, the modified strategy will make at tl. For every bet on Q that the bettor's original strategy makes at t2, if Pi is the true member of the partition, the modified strategy substitutes a bet on Q conditional on Pi made at tl, (which can be attained by a finite number of unconditional bets made at tl). Given that the bookie is a conditionalizer and that the true member of the partition is announced at t2, the payoff must be the same. A dynamic Dutch book can therefore be made against the conditionalizer only if a static Dutch book can be made against him at t1 by a finite number of bets that he considers fair. This we know to be impossible given that he respects the probability calculus at t1 since the expectation of the sum of a finite number of random variables, each with zero expectation, is zero; while the expectation of a betting arrangement which constitutes a Dutch book must be negative.
5.2. Probability Kinematics. In the discussion of the Observation Game, it is shown that the bookie's strategy must proceed by probability kinematics on the partition, to be "bulletproof." This is somewhat weaker than an unconditional Dutch book. The converse would then be somewhat stronger than the converse to a Dutch book; that is, that belief change by probability kinematics is "bulletproof." Consider first the case of "coarsegrained observation by candlelight" where the bookie in the observation game has only a finite number of pr2's possible. We will argue that if the bookie has a strategy of belief change by probability kinematics on the partition of colors, and if his strategy meets an INTERIOR condition, we can embed the observation game in a bigger Lewis game such that the bookie's strategy in the original game fails to be bulletproof only if a strategy of conditionalization in the Lewis game can have a dynamic Dutch book made against it. This is impossible by the results of the previous section.
The larger game is constructed along the lines suggested by section 4. The bookie has a larger probability space, which is the product of a space of N elements (Pl,. . . ,p,) (for the N possible Pr2's over the color-flavor space) with the original color-flavor space. The bookie has a prior over this space that gives each atom positive probability. At time t2 a pi is announced and the bookie must move to a new probability, pr2, by a rule which makes pr2 a function of the announced pi. Pr2 must be a non-zero for each color-flavored pair. At time t3 a color is announced and the bookie must move to a new probability, Pr3, by a rule that makes Pr3 a function of Pr2 and COLOR. This larger game is the composition of two Lewis games for the move from t1 to t2 and the move from t2 to t3, for which we know that the strategy of conditionalization is both a necessary and sufficient condition for immunity from Dutch book.
The possible probability assignments over a discrete space of m objects can be thought of as represented by the points in an m-i dimensional polyhedron in m dimensional space. The n pi's that are considered by the bookie's strategy in the original game to be possible pr2's are to be thought of as n points in the interior of such a polyhedron (the interior because they must all give each color-flavor pair non-zero probability.) The IN-TERIOR condition on the bookie's strategy in the original game is that his prl over the color-flavor space be in the interior of the convex hull of the pi's. If the INTERIOR condition is met, it follows that the bookie's prl can be represented as a non-trivial mixture of his pi's, that is, one which gives each pi non-zero mixing coefficient.
The bookie's prl in the smaller game is extended to PR1 over the probability space of the bigger game as follows: ((3) and its relation to probability kinematics are discussed in Armendt (1980), Good (1981) , and Skyrms (1980a Skyrms ( , 1980b .)
Now let a bookie's strategy in the big game be belief change by con-ditionalization. His behavior vis-a-vis the color-flavor space will be indistinguishable from that of a bookie pursuing a strategy of belief change by probability kinematics in the smaller game. The initial probabilities at t1 are the same by (2). At t2 when the Pi resulting from the observation interaction becomes known the probabilities are the same by (1). At t3 when the true color becomes known as well, the probabilities are the same by (3). Consequently, a bettor's strategy that will score against a strategy of belief change by probability kinematics that meets the INTERIOR condition in the observation game will score against the strategy of conditionalization in the bigger game. But a score against the conditionalizing strategy in the bigger game could be turned into an unconditional dynamic Dutch book if the course of play leading to that score has positive prior probability, by making a suitable sidebet against that course of play in the standard way. Each course of play does have positive prior probability. PR(pi) is positive by (2). PR1(C/pi) is positive by (1) together with the requirement of the observation game that each possible probability at t2 gives each atom of the color-flavor space positive probability. We know that a bettor's strategy that constitutes an unconditional dynamic Dutch book against the conditionalizationing strategy in the larger game is impossible from the previous section. So we have shown:
THEOREM VI. In the case in which the bookie has a finite number of possible pr2's in the observation game, if his strategy proceeds by probability kinematics on the partition of colors and meets the IN-TERIOR condition, his strategy is bulletproof.
What can we say about the general case where the bookie's strategy may recognize infinitely many pr2's as possible? Call a strategy catholic if it contains pr2's that distribute probabilities among the colors in every possible way consistent with giving each color non-zero probability. If we idealize our observer so that he has no trouble dealing with arbitrary real numbers, a catholic strategy will be for him a sign of open-mindedness about what observation will bring. For each possible prl (which gives each atom of the color-flavor space positive probability) there is a unique catholic probability kinematics strategy for the bookie. (The quadruples have the given prl as first coordinate. The second coordinate is a pr2 determined by an arbitrary pr2 for color, extended to flavor by probability kinematics. The third coordinate is an arbitrary color. The fourth coordinate is a pr3 gotten from the second coordinate by conditionalization on the third.) THEOREM VII. A catholic strategy of belief change by probability kinematics in the observation game is bulletproof.
Proof. Suppose that it is not bulletproof. Then some bettor's strategy can score against it. The bettor's strategy scores against that of the bookie if (1) there is a sequence of play in which the bettor ends up at t3 with bets whose net payoff is positive for him (negative for the bookie) for every flavor, and (2) for every sequence of play, the bettor's winnings are non-negative for every flavor. So if a bettor's strategy will score against the bookie's infinite strategy, it will score against any finite substrategy of that strategy that includes (one of) the quadruples of the type described under (1). Let q = (pr1,pr2,C,pr3) be such a quadruple relative to the hypothesized score against the infinite strategy. There is a finite substrategy of the original strategy that meets the INTERIOR condition. Since pr1 gives each colorflavor atom non-zero probability, it is in the interior of the convex hull of the probabilities that can be gotten from pr1 by conditionalization on a color. Consider the probability measures that can be gotten by from pr1 by "almost conditionalizing" on colors, that is, by probability kinematics on the partition of colors that gives the color "almost conditionalized on" probability 1-e. Call these the V's. Given pr1 we can choose e small enough so that pr1 is in the interior of the convex hull of the V's. As our possible pr2's of the finite substrategy, we take the V's together with the pr2 of the quadruple q. The finite substrategy consists of all the quadruples in the original strategy having one of these pr2's. This is a finite number because there are only a finite number of possible colors, C, and Pr3 is a function of C. So if the bettor's strategy will score against the original infinite strategy, it will score against this finite substrategy, but this is impossible by the previous theorem.
6. Diachronic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Conditionalization is such a natural way to for updating degrees of belief that Hacking needed to remind us that it required a justification. When it is regarded as a rule or strategy applicable to a certain sort of situation that is commonly approximated by our experience, a justification is forthcoming. In such situations, adoption of any alternative rule, strategy, or habit leads an agent to dynamic incoherence regarding conditional bets. In effect, he adopts two distinct fair betting quotients for conditional bets depending on how they are described, where the equivalence of the descriptions is a simple consequence of Boolean logic together with his own rule. In such situations, adoption of the rule of conditionalization guarantees coherence. But not every learning situation is of the kind to which conditionalization applies. The situation may not be of the kind that can be correctly described or even usefully approximated as the attainment of certainty by the agent in some proposition in his degree of belief space. The rule of belief change by probability kinematics on a partition was designed to apply to a much broader class of learning situations than the rule of conditionalization. In those situations for which it was designed, it preserves the virtues of conditionalization.5 It is coherent and any rule which conflicts with it is not. This is not to say that we can build an adequate epistemology solely on the rule of belief change by probability kinematics. That rule has its own limits of applicability; its justification here occurs within the context of the observation game. Other models of learning situations are possible, and each poses the question: "What rule or rules for belief change are dynamically coherent for this sort of situation?"
